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The purpose of this article is to critically evaluate what is perceived as shortcomings in the 
scholarly field of African-centered psychology and mode of transcendence, specifically in 
terms of the existence of an African identity.  A great number of scholars advocate a total 
embrace of a universal African identity that unites Africans in the diaspora and those on 
the continent and that can be used as a remedy to a Eurocentric domination of psychology 
at the detriment of Black communities’ specific needs.  Another group of scholars argue 
for a relative African identity, emphasizing diversity and differences among African people 
both on the continent and in the diaspora.  Considering that the earlier works in the field 
focused on laying its ideological foundation, this paper suggests that African-centered 
psychology and mode of transcendence should:  (a) move beyond discussions on ideologies 
and identities, (b) concentrate on developing practical applications of its guiding principles, 
and (c) reclaim the relevance of an African history, memory, and past.  In other words, 
having reclaimed African history, memory, and past, African-centered psychology can move 
away from ism and advance toward more praxis..
A. Ebede-Ndi
California Institute of Integral Studies 
San Francisco, CA, USA
Keywords: African-centered psychology, African studies, Afrocentrism, Négritude, Pan-Africanism 
In their overview of transpersonal psychology’s growth trajectory, Hartelius, Caplan, and Rardin (2007) reflected that “the growing transpersonal community 
could benefit greatly from transpersonal associations 
throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America—not so 
Westerners might come as missionaries and teach the 
transpersonal, but because the Western community 
needs the participation of these communities” (p. 17).  In 
addition, they argued that “if transpersonal psychology 
aspires to be a fully integrative human psychology, a 
psychology that is not only East-West but also North-
South, it will need to invite voices from the rest of the 
world” (p. 17).  Towards the purpose of redressing this 
imbalance, this article presents an overview of the field 
of African-centered psychology/studies and mode of 
transcendence.  The focus here is not to describe specific 
African-centered transpersonal phenomena, but to 
critically evaluate the field and offer suggestions for a 
more practical direction.
This article aims not only to engage scholars 
within the field of African-centered psychology, but 
also to inform psychologists of non-African-centered 
descent of the literature and praxis in the said field, and 
argue for more professional attention within the field 
of psychology to the needs of Black communities and 
the ways to address those needs.  Embedded in this 
discussion is the premise that one cannot argue for the 
relevance of an African-centered psychology without an 
a priori recognition of the existence of an African history, 
memory, and past.  The following section attempts to 
define key concepts that are relevant to understand the 
history of and the discussion within the scholarly field of 
African-centered psychology.  
The Question of an African Identity
There are opposing views about the existence of an African identity and the nature of an African-
centered psychology.  Africa is a continent of 54 countries, 
and each country has its own tribes and cultures; it 
is then not possible to describe an African-centered 
psychology that represents all Africans.  However, in 
order to understand the conversation around the idea of 
an African-centered psychology, it is necessary to define 
related concepts.  A quick search of the term “African-
centered” redirects one to the notions of “Afrocentrism,” 
“Afrocentricity,” or “Africology,” which is the study of 
Black, African, African American, Africana and/or Afro-
American.
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Afrocentrism or Afrocentricity 
The term Afrocentrism is believed to have 
originated in 1962 (Moses, 1998) and Afrocentricity in 
the 1970s (Thairu & Wahinya, 1975).  Both terms are 
used essentially as a cultural ideology or worldview by 
mostly African Americans and Africans of the diaspora. 
Even though Afrocentric ideas may date back at least to 
the 1890s (Conyers, 2004), the concept was revived in 
the 1960s and 1970s.  African American intellectuals, 
inspired by African-centered scholars’ groundbreaking 
works of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
(i.e., Du Bois, 1903, 1915, 1933, 1939; Fanon, 1952, 1961; 
Guthrie, 1976; Jones, 1972; Nobles, 1974), and motivated 
by the Civil Rights movement and the development of 
African American Studies programs in universities in 
the United States, sought self-determination through the 
rehabilitation of their African cultural heritage.
The term Afrocentric has been traced by 
Derrick Alridge to W. E. B. Du Bois who used it in 
the 1960s, but it was Asante who appropriated the term 
and popularized it in Afrocentricity: The Theory of Social 
Change (1980) and later in The Afrocentric Idea (1998). 
Asante (2000) stated that the Afrocentric idea as a cultural 
configuration was distinguished by five characteristics: 
1. An intense interest in psychological location 
as determined by symbols, motifs, rituals, and 
signs
2. A commitment to finding the subject-place of 
Africans in any social, political, economic, or 
religious phenomenon with implications for 
questions of sex, gender, and class
3. A defense of African cultural elements as 
historically valid in the context of art, music, 
and literature
4. A celebration of centeredness and agency 
and a commitment to lexical refinement that 
eliminates pejoratives about Africans or other 
people
5. A powerful imperative from historical sources 
to revise the collective text of African people.   
Akbar (1991) argued that Afrocentricity involves 
the identification of the continuous ancient voice in its 
call to a realization of an authentic African people.  His 
aim was to develop an African agency that does not derive 
from the negative aspects of being “Black” people on the 
continent or anywhere in the diaspora.  He emphasized 
the positive features of basic African philosophy that 
dictate the values, customs, attitudes, and behaviors of 
Africans in Africa and in the New World (Nobles, 1980), 
and the reclamation, re-ascension, and revitalization of 
an African psychology (Noble, 1986).
The end of slavery in the United States in the 
1860s and the decline of colonialism in Africa in the 
1960s were major social changes that created conditions 
for the rise of Black consciousness around the world. 
But it was in the United States that such changes 
received transformational impetus.  African American 
intellectuals, who constantly lived under Euro-American 
organized racism and repression, needed to develop 
a counter-narrative where they could self-determine. 
Afrocentrism became a counter-narrative that seeks to 
highlight the contributions of African people worldwide 
(Asante, 1980, 1998, 2000).
Critique of Afrocentrism 
Afrocentrism is generally defined as the study 
of African peoples using an Africa-centered lens.  The 
problem with this definition is the placement of Africa 
at the center of any analysis of African history and 
culture, including the African American experience 
(Oyebade, 1990).  Conflating the African and African 
American experience could present some methodological 
challenge.  For example, in the early 1960s, Africa-
centered historiography scholars consciously grounded 
their research in African methodology; but, Oyebade 
(1990) argued, “the theoretical conceptualization of an 
Africa-centered approach is the handiwork of Afrocentric 
scholars such as Molefi Kete Asante, Tsheloane Keto, 
Mualana Karenga, and a host of others based in the 
United States” (p. 233).  Shifting the focus from 
methodology to theory may open the field to different 
kinds of ideological interpretations.  Yet, what the field 
needs today is to move away from ideological ism and 
focus more on methodological praxis.  
Critics argued that Afrocentrism, as an ideology, 
offers little more than “a psychological and therapeutic 
feel-good-together philosophy” (Adeleke, 2009, p. 
180) or a new reconstruction of world history full of 
historical myths and legends (Shavit, 2001).  Cain Hope 
Felder (1994) warned Afrocentrists not to demonize 
categorically all white people, vilify European heritage 
to the point that Europe epitomizes all the evil in the 
world, and that gross over-generalizations and using 
factually or incorrect material is bad history and bad 
scholarship.  Despite the critics’ opinion, Afrocentrism 
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is an important aspect of a Pan-African conversation 
about the identity and the relevance of the knowledge of 
Africans on the continent and in the diaspora.
Pan-Africanism and the Diaspora 
Pan-Africanism is an ideology and movement 
that encourages the solidarity of Africans worldwide. 
It is based on the belief that unity is vital to economic, 
social, and political progress and aims to “unify and 
uplift” people of African descent.  In psychology, 
Pan-Africanism could be understood as the common 
lived experience, felt emotion, and shared memory of 
African people on the continent and in the diaspora. 
In his definition of diaspora, Safran (1991) said that its 
constituent elements include:
Dispersal from a homeland, often by violent forces, 
the making of a memory, and a vision of that 
homeland, marginalization in the new location, a 
commitment to the maintenance/restoration of the 
homeland, and desire for return and a continuing 
relationship and identity with the homeland that 
shapes the consciousness and solidarity of the group. 
(pp. 83-84)
 
 This definition illustrates the motivating 
sentiment behind the Pan-African movement of the early 
twentieth century.  Pan-African ideas could be traced 
back to the first resistance on the slave ships—rebellions 
and suicides—through the constant plantation and 
colonial uprising and the “Back to Africa” movements of 
the nineteenth century (PADEAP, 2011), and emerged as 
a distinct political movement initially formed and led by 
people from the diaspora who focused on the struggles of 
the African people against enslavement and colonization. 
 The use of diaspora emerges directly out of the 
growing scholarly interest in the Pan-African movement 
in particular, and in Black Internationalism in general, 
that began to develop in the 1950s.  The need for the 
reunification of diasporic and continental Africans was 
expressed decades earlier (Du Bois, 1933).  This movement 
was born out of the necessity to confront or heal the slavery 
legacy through racial organization:  through ideologies of 
a real or symbolic return to Africa (Edwards, 2001).  In this 
way, Africans of the diaspora imagined a unified identity 
that was dependent on a common relationship to Africa. 
 In 1900, Henry Sylvester Williams from Trinidad 
called a conference that took place in London, UK, to 
protest the stealing of the lands in the colonies, racial 
discrimination, and other relevant issues of interest to 
Blacks (PADEAP, 2011).  In 1919, an African American, 
W. E. B. Du Bois, convened the first Pan-African 
congress in Paris, France, demanding the independence 
of African nations. Further congresses—essentially 
extended meetings of like-minded Africans searching for 
a way forward—were held in 1921 in London, Brussels, 
Paris, in 1923 in London and Lisbon, and in 1927 in New 
York (PADEAP, 2011).  Arguably, the most important 
Pan-African congress was held in 1945 in Manchester 
where a large number of African representatives 
from the continent attended for the first time, which 
resulted in a gained momentum that contributed to 
the independence movements of the 1950s and 1960s. 
 Throughout the twentieth century, cultural Pan-
Africanism weaved through the political narrative—
the Harlem Renaissance, Francophone philosophies 
of Négritude, Afrocentrism, Rastafarianism and Hip 
Hop (PADEAP, 2011)—advocating self-determination 
of Blacks.  In 1974 the 6th Pan-African Congress took 
place in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, fueled by the radical 
Black movements that swept the diaspora, espousing 
militant Black pride, fighting White domination with 
Black separatist organization, and advocating the global 
unity of Black people struggling for liberation.  The 
7th Congress in Kampala, Uganda, in 1994 set up a 
permanent organizational structure to carry forward 
decisions taken at the Congress meetings.  There were 
and still are inherent divisions and debates within 
the Pan-African movement, according to PADEAP 
(2011):  is Pan-Africanism a movement of the people or 
has it now been taken over by governments, are Black 
Africans of Sub-Saharan origin the only true Africans? 
Pan-Africanism may not be different from any other 
broad-based and passionate political movement, 
namely the Black Lives Matter movement in the USA. 
Critique of (Pan) African Identity
At the heart of the Pan-African debate is the 
question of an African identity.  Scholars argue that 
the very idea of an African identity is a conflation; it 
is the main fallacy upon which the concept of an 
African diaspora largely depends on for its validation 
(Hartman, 2007; Mengestus, 2007).  African identities, 
such as African languages, are inventions, mutually 
constitutive existential and epistemic constructions: 
“Invention implies a history, a social process; it 
denaturalizes cultural artifacts and practices, stripping 
them of primordial authenticity and essentialism” 
(Zeleza, 2006, p. 14).  The idea of Africa is complex 
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and any attempt to define it may swing unsteadily 
between the poles of essentialism and contingency. 
 The essentialist pole comes from a critique of 
racial purity in Euro-America and posits that Africa 
arises from similarly complex crossings across race 
and ethnicity.  With this stance, some scholars may 
argue, Du Bois (1915, 1939) may be taking interethnic 
crossing to be as identity-constituting and identity-
fracturing as interracial crossing.  The flip side of that 
argument, they might say, is the view that imposes a 
model of racial homogeneity onto ethno-diversity, 
flattening important differences among various African 
people, and underscoring the question of who is the 
only true African.  However, this position may be 
shortsighted especially when looked at it through the 
lens of postmodern essentialism.  When Du Bois (1903) 
discussed the notion of double consciousness he was 
suggesting that Blacks were simultaneously inside and 
outside the West and developed two senses of self: one 
from within their respective communities and the other 
from a larger Eurocentric dominant culture.  This double 
consciousness may not only apply to the perceptions 
and representations related to interracial and interethnic 
crossings but could be applied to interracial marriages 
as well.  The general point Du Bois was making with 
his color-line theory was to reflect on the role of race 
and racism in history and society, calling the world’s 
attention to an eventual response of the oppressed, 
who happened to be people of color to the oppressors, 
who happened to be Whites or people of European 
descent.  Such an argument did not necessarily 
contradict Du Bois’ Pan-African ideas and demand 
for the liberation of African nations and Black (color) 
people everywhere, on the contrary, it confirmed it. 
 On the other hand, the contingency pole 
comes from a critique of racial homogeneity in Africa 
and posits that DNA research may show that Africans 
are more diverse than homogeneous and cannot be 
used to support the Pan-African ideas of an African 
identity and/or common lived experience. Keguro 
(2008) argued that the promise of DNA testing for 
many diasporic people is that it might reveal where their 
ancestors may once have lived and loved, traveled and 
married.  Such research, this view maintains, tells one 
more about movement and travel.  It tells a contingent 
story: at this moment, in this year, this individual was 
in this place—and in telling such a story it opens up 
narrative possibilities.  How did this person come to be 
in this place at this particular time?  What kind of life 
situation allowed this person to travel to, live in, love 
in, or be captured in this place?  Instead of focusing on 
place and the mobility of people, DNA research should 
give insight into the practices of community formation 
and re-formation:  siblings who traveled together and 
apart to form unique and related family groups; ethno-
groupings that are occasional, disrupted, and disruptive 
(Keguro, 2008).  Therefore, one might discover that 
Africans are more continental, more multi-ethnic, and 
less rooted and homogeneous than they imagine.  In 
such a scenario, Keguro concluded, diasporic African 
researches into and complications of identity have much 
to teach some Africans about their own forms of diversity, 
about the historically situated aspect of how they have 
come to be specific, and the stories of how they have 
always been more diverse than they imagine or claim. 
 The point Keguro made could be used to 
debunk the essentialist argument of imposing racial 
homogeneity onto ethnic diversity by showing that Pan-
Africanism is more heterogeneous than homogeneous. 
However, what Keguro is not addressing is that the 
problem of an African identity is not necessarily 
one of diversity but is one of validity and self-
determination.  DNA focus on place is one aspect, 
contingent practices of community formation and 
re-formation is another.  DNA findings and research 
in community practices may lead to the development 
of praxis that would contribute to the rehabilitation 
of an African history and memory, the legitimation 
of an African knowledge, and the validation of an 
African science, regardless of how heterogeneous or 
homogeneous African people are.  Such praxis “cannot 
be something imposed from above, but must be found 
in the authentic lives of the people as they maintain 
their own sense of dignity” (Asante, 2009, p. 3). 
 Diasporic and continental African relationships 
are nuanced and finding a historical, political, and 
cultural unity can be challenging.  On the one hand, 
Du Bois and Safran assumed that there is a nationalistic 
tie that binds all “Negro peoples” together by virtue of 
some inherently shared relationship to Africa.  On the 
other hand, Hartman and Mengestus critiqued this link 
that supposedly ties the diaspora together.  For example, 
Hartman (2007) argued that the simplistic reduction 
involved in defining a diasporic community with an 
identifiable kinship to “an African continental family” 
(p. 6) is one that exists in a constructed realm dependent 
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on the concept of race which was “developed in the 
modern period and in the context of the slave trade” 
(p. 5).   Mengestus (2007) presented a more nuanced 
view that neither agrees nor disagrees with this imagined 
racial connection and instead takes a middle ground 
position and acknowledges the complexly different 
trajectories of the continent’s many languages and 
cultures.  Nevertheless, the question of race and kinship 
between diasporic and continental Africans becomes 
obsolete once one recognizes that there was an Africa 
before slavery and colonization, which had a history 
and memory.  The wisdom and knowledge contained in 
the many languages and cultures of the continent could 
then lay the foundation for Africa’s ability for knowledge 
production in service of humanity:
Contrary to popular perceptions, Black psychology, 
as being developed in the United States, is neither 
narrowly race-specific nor limited ethnically or 
geographically.  It is the self-conscious “centering” 
of psychological analyses and applications in 
African realities, cultures, and epistemologies.  
(Nobles, 2013, pp. 292-299) 
Although the subject of African identities is vast 
and complex as the continent itself, it could become a 
distraction.  For methodological purposes, one could 
select an area of research and develop appropriate 
praxis.  For example, there are religious, ecological, 
linguistic, and even ethnic taxonomies.  There is 
also Africa as biology/racial, image/representational, 
space/geographical, and memory/historical (Zeleza, 
2006).  Africa as memory is relevant for this article as 
it represents a racial, representational, and geographical 
link between diasporic and continental Africans, who 
share similar experiences and related cultural and 
historical worldviews.  Diasporic or African Americans 
have experienced slavery, involuntary relocation, social 
and racial discrimination and alienation in the new 
land.  Continental Africans have experienced slavery, 
colonization, and alienation in their own land.  Both are 
experiencing a global despise and/or rejection of their 
very existence, arguably, and maybe solely, based on how 
they look, behave, and possibly their skin color.  This 
commonly lived experience could explain their strong 
emotional attachment to their shared memory expressed 
in Pan-Africanism or today’s Black Lives Matter 
movement and other related emancipatory movements 
and could not just be mere inventions. 
 
Eurocentric Critique 
of African-Centered Studies
African-centered studies or African studies focus on studying African cultures and communities and also 
work for the knowledge and emancipation of the African 
people.  The field includes essentially the study of history: 
pre-colonial (before the 19th century), colonial (between 
19th and 20th centuries), and post-colonial (after WWII, 
in the 1950s, 1960s, and beyond); demography: ethnic 
and tribal groups; religion: Christianity, Islam, traditional 
religions; culture, politics, economy, and languages.  The 
main approach is critical, questioning epistemological 
paradigms, theories, and methods used in traditional/
mainstream disciplines and how they relate to African 
ways of knowing and/or references.  In general, African-
centered studies are interdisciplinary, comprehensive, 
and appropriately designed to tackle the complexity of 
issues related to African-centeredness.      
Considering the background and context of the 
concepts previously defined, it seems more appropriate 
to talk about African-centered studies in a much broader 
sense than to talk about African-centered psychology 
more specifically.  The diversity of the African people 
around the world warrants a complex approach to 
study their reality.  Such approach was hinted at in 
the definition of Afrocentrism and Pan-Africanism. 
These concepts revealed intersections between history, 
psychology, anthropology, sociology, philosophy, and 
even political science.  
One may not be able to fully describe African-
centered studies without a priori acknowledging the 
existence of an African history and memory, recognizing 
the validity of African knowledge, and denouncing the 
negative effect of colonialism and to some extent slavery 
on the African people and their knowledge.  Such 
efforts were attempted in Pan-African and Afrocentric 
movements.  However, one of the main critiques of 
Afrocentric scholars was their alleged falsification of 
African/Black history and their “bad scholarship.” 
This critique, as fair as it may sound, forces one to 
reflect on its possible implicit assumption.  Africans 
have been made to believe that they do not possess 
the tools and knowledge to write their own history: 
The Negro…exhibits the natural man in his 
completely wild and untamed state. We must lay 
aside all thought of reverence and morality – all that 
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we call feeling – if we would rightly comprehend 
him; there is nothing harmonious with humanity to 
be found in this type of character. (Hegel, 1956, p. 
93, as cited in Nobles & Cooper, 2013, p. 347) 
This point of view has been used, like a Pavlov 
reflex, to condition African people to think they are an 
inferior race.  Hegel (1956) went further to say, “at this 
point we leave Africa, not to mention it again.  For it is 
no historical part of the World; it has no movement or 
development to exhibit” (p. 99) and he concluded, “what 
we properly understand by Africa, is the Unhistorical, 
Undeveloped Spirit, still involved in the conditions of mere 
nature, and which had to be presented here only as on the 
threshold of the World’s History” (p. 99).  Hegel strongly 
believed that one cannot read anything an African writes 
without seeing “anathema” all over it.  Interestingly, 
Hegel’s argument was also echoed by prominent African 
scholars.  Senghor (1964), a highly respected African 
intellectual, stated, “L’ émotion est Nègre, comme la raison 
est Héllène” (emotion is Negro, as reason is Hellenic; p. 
288).  Senghor, like Hegel, believed that a Black person 
could not use his or her neocortex or rational mind because 
s/he was still stuck in his/her reptilian brain and that 
anything rational must come from Helena, the symbol 
of Greece’s beauty and the cradle of Western rationalism 
and civilization.  Frantz Fanon, and later Eduardo Duran 
and Bonnie Duran, in a different context but similar 
idea, called such phenomenon “lactification,” a process 
whereby any indigenous (Black/Brown person) must 
obtain the approval of a White person in order to validate 
his or her knowledge (Duran & Duran, 1995, p. 4; 
Fanon, 1952, p. 47).  
This way of thinking goes to show that the 
non-recognition of the existence of an African history 
and memory is similar to the non-recognition of the 
existence of African knowledge and by extension 
African-centered studies.  This could also be called 
“bad scholarship,” especially when it is known that 
people have lived in Africa for more than three million 
years and, therefore, should possess a rich and varied 
history as illustrated by the Egyptian pyramids and 
hieroglyphics, the ancient kingdoms of Zimbabwe, 
Ghana, Mali, Congo, and others.  Furthermore, Nobles 
and Cooper gave the proper answer to Hegel’s distortion: 
In spite of our Westernization, the antibody of our 
common core ancestral cultural legacy has kept, to 
a great extent, an African mind here and an African 
mind there from being completely torn asunder. 
Though extremely destructive, Hegel’s lie was and 
is nothing more than a phantom (a bodiless energy 
without real existence) that on closer examination 
dissolves, yet tends to leave a lingering doubt about 
its veracity, implanting its insinuation in a brake to 
collective action. (Nobles & Cooper, 2013, p. 347) 
One could make a cogent argument that 
because African communities favor oral transmission 
of knowledge, and that orally transmitted knowledge 
may be altered or lost from generation to generation, it is 
challenging to recognize and/or document their history. 
The counter argument could also be that with research in 
genetics, archeology, linguistics, and artifacts, one could 
reconstruct or reclaim an African history, memory, and 
knowledge.  The question is who has the authority to 
do that work and/or validate that knowledge.  Africans 
have been made to believe that it is not them.  Senghor, 
for example, believed that without France, Africa was 
lost and in a speech said that Africans do not want to 
leave the French compound, they have grown up in 
it and it was good for them to be alive in it (Nugent, 
2004).  He then became the first African to be elected 
in l’Académie Française.  Later in his life, in a conscious 
awakening, probably because of his disillusionment in 
France, he realized the strong dominance of French 
culture in Africa, and the perception that Africa did 
not have culture developed enough to stand alongside 
that of Europe.  With Aimé Césaire and Léon Damas, 
Senghor created the concept of Négritude, an important 
intellectual movement that sought to assert and to 
valorize what they believe to be distinctive African 
characteristics, values, and aesthetics.
Négritude 
Martiniquean poet Aimé Césaire, Léopold 
Sédar Senghor, a future President of Senegal, and 
Léon Damas of French Guiana, and others, created 
Négritude as a literary and ideological philosophy in 
the 1930s when the general mood among Blacks was 
about the affirmation of Blackness and the fight for 
the decolonization of African nations.  These African-
centered scholars were dissatisfied and disgusted by 
French colonialism and argued that the best strategy 
to reject it was to encourage a common racial identity 
for Black Africans worldwide, a Pan-African identity of 
some sort.  They intentionally chose the term Négritude 
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and meant to be provocative by appropriating it, because 
it came from Latin niger and was used exclusively in a 
racist context within France when referring to Black 
people.  They maintained that Blacks did have a history 
and a worthy culture, and that it was capable of standing 
alongside the cultures of other countries as equals while, 
at the same time, denouncing Europe’s alleged lack of 
humanity, and the rejection of Western domination and 
ideas.
Négritude became immediately controversial. 
In 1948, Jean-Paul Sartre analyzed the Négritude 
philosophy in an essay called “Orphée Noir” (Black 
Orpheus) and characterized it as the opposite of colonial 
racism in a Hegelian dialectic, a description of the 
relationship between the master and the slave, and with 
it, he helped to introduce Négritude issues to French 
intellectuals as a valid academic contribution to his 
existential theory.  Sartre believed that Négritude was a 
“racisme antiraciste” (anti-racist racism), a strategy with 
a final goal of racial unity (p. xiv).  Even some Black 
scholars critiqued Négritude philosophy.  The Nigerian 
icon and 1986 Nobel Peace Prize, Wole Soyinka, 
believed that by deliberately and outspokenly being 
proud of their ethnicity, Black people were automatically 
on the defensive and said, “Un tigre ne proclame pas sa 
tigritude, il saute sur sa proie et la dévore” (a tiger does not 
proclaim its tigritude (tigerness); it jumps on its prey and 
devours it; as cited by Madinin-Art, 2006, para. 19).  The 
implication of Soyinka’s point is that one should be proud 
of an achievement, being Black is not an achievement, but 
it is a natural, essential, and existential fact.  Following 
the same logic, the South African Keorapetse Kgositsile 
argued that the term was based too much on Blackness 
according to a Caucasian aesthetic, and was unable to 
define a new kind of perception of Africanness that 
would free Black art from Caucasian conceptualizations 
altogether (Kgositsile, 1968). 
Related Concepts 
It is important to note that an archaic use of the 
term Négritude was identified much earlier in America 
in the context of race.  American physician, Benjamin 
Rush, a signer of the United States Declaration of 
Independence, used the term Négritude to imagine a 
rhetorical “disease” which he said was a mild form of 
leprosy whose only cure was to become White (Jackson, 
2002).  This early use of the term may not have been 
known to Aimé Césaire, Léon Damas, and Leopold 
Sedar Senghor when they developed the Négritude 
philosophy, but it only confirms the racial characteristic 
of said term that the aforementioned scholars wanted to 
expose.
It is also worth noting that the Négritude 
philosophy developed alongside a few likeminded 
movements, namely the Harlem Renaissance and 
Noirisme. The Harlem Renaissance was the name given 
to the cultural, social, and artistic explosion that took 
place in Harlem between the end of World War I and the 
middle of the 1930s.  During that period, Harlem was 
a cultural center, drawing Black writers, artists, 
musicians, photographers, poets, scholars, and authors 
(such as Claude McKay and Langston Hughes), who 
laid groundwork for Black expression, which helped 
to inspire Senghor, Damas and Césaire when they 
developed Négritude.  On the other hand, Noirisme 
could be understood as radical, psychological, cultural, 
ethnological and political ideology, which argued for 
Black supremacy in Haitian politics.  Although some 
saw Noirisme as the Haitian version of Négritude, 
most writers of the Négritude philosophy were quick to 
distance themselves from Noirisme when they realized 
the extent of its radicalism.
In an effort to respond to critics, the founders 
of Négritude argued that their philosophy was by no 
means an anti-White racism, but rather emphasized the 
importance of dialogue and exchange among different 
cultures, a point that was obviously rejected by Jean-Paul 
Sartre.  Nevertheless, Cheikh Anta Diop (1974), a giant 
of African intellectualism, sounded the alarm a long time 
ago, denouncing the double standard when critiquing 
African scholars:
 
Have foreign intellectuals, who challenge our 
intentions and accuse us of all kinds of hidden motives 
or ridiculous ideas, proceeded any differently?  When 
they explain their own historical past or study their 
languages, that seems normal.  Yet, when an African 
does likewise to help reconstruct the national 
personality of his people, distorted by colonialism, 
that is considered backward or alarming. (p. xiii)
Consequently, and based on the complexity of 
the topic, African-centered studies or African-centered 
psychology presents many challenges created by a 
stubborn denial of a well-established African history and 
the existence of an African memory and past.  Morrison 
(1984) also made the case that some of Africans’ beliefs 
and practices were “discredited knowledge,” discredited 
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only because Black people were discredited therefore 
what they knew was “discredited” (p. 62).
The discredit of African knowledge is based on 
criteria from other paradigms.  Those criteria are mostly 
predetermined frameworks of analysis developed from 
predefined parameters by ways of Western categories 
rather than the ones that emerge from Africans’ lived 
experiences.  This often results in a constant compare-
and-contrast analysis rather that an analysis in and 
of itself.  Defining African knowledge and concepts 
parallel to Western concepts actually proceeds from and 
reinforces an understanding of the dominant position 
of the Euro-American culture and risks constructing an 
African identity by its relationship to Western template. 
This, in turn, might imply advocating the acceptance 
of African worldview or ways of knowing in a Western 
world.  African wisdom and science represents a legitimate 
mode of social and human science exploration, without 
apology to Western exclusive way of knowing.  The goal 
should not be to have to base the existence or integrity of 
African knowledge on an oppositional relationship, but 
to find a language that is accessible to African and non-
African audiences.  In order for this to happen, African-
centered scholars should be able to develop methods 
and praxis capable of assessing and explaining the steps 
involved in traditional healing sessions, describing mental 
processes and behavior patterns as suggested in legends, 
fables, folklore, folktale, movement, and symbols.    
 
African-Centered Psychology and the 
Transpersonal Dimension
Given the difficulty to define an African identity as shown in Afrocentrism and Pan-Africanism, 
the complexity of the relationship between Africans 
of the diaspora and those on the continent, and the 
need for an African-centered psychology, scholars from 
the Association of Black Psychologists (ABPsi) have 
attempted to develop a few theories and methods to 
facilitate the conversation.   
Theoretical Orientation
There is agreement among African-centered 
scholars about the goal of an African-centered 
psychology, which is the liberation of the African mind, 
empowerment of the African character, and enlivenment 
and illumination of the African spirit. However, the 
theories and methods about how to achieve that goal 
are different.  Karenga (1992) has identified essentially 
three main theoretical orientations: the traditional, 
the reformist, and the radical.  According to Jamison 
(2008) and Karenga (1992), the traditional theoretical 
orientation is characterized by scholars who are not 
necessarily interested in the existence and/or development 
of African/Black psychology, but continue to support 
“traditional” Eurocentric psychological models with 
minor changes.  Those scholars believe in changing 
White attitudes by being critical of the models they 
subscribe to without suggesting new approaches to solve 
the problems.
The reformists have a more ideological 
orientation.  Like the traditional theoretical orientation, 
the reformists also believe in changing White attitudes, 
but focus on confronting public policies that maintain 
and support institutional racism (Karenga, 1992).  The 
reformist theoretical orientation “tend[s] to emphasize the 
American slavery legacies of the continuing oppression of 
Blacks in America” (Kambon, 1998, p. 231).  On the 
other hand, the radical theoretical orientation is not 
concerned with changing White attitudes. Members of 
this orientation, Nobles (1974), Akbar (1994), Kambon 
(1998), and others, believe that an African worldview 
analysis is essential to understanding the psychology of 
people of African descent, because an African-centered 
psychology cannot be developed in a Euro-American 
organization; therefore they need to return to African 
values, philosophy, and psychology in order to develop 
tools and instruments necessary to meet the needs of 
Black people everywhere, thus marking a shift from 
ideological ism to more cultural and methodological 
praxis.
Methodological Perspective
The methods that deal with Black issues are as 
complex as the issues themselves.  Banks (1982) identified 
those critical approaches or methods as deconstructive, 
reconstructive, and constructive.  The deconstructionists 
denounce and expose the biases and weaknesses in the 
scientific literature about Black people, but they stop 
there.  The reconstructionists take it a step further by 
correcting those biases and by attempting to modify and 
reconstruct existing models into more culturally relevant 
models for Blacks (Kambon, 1998; Nobles, 1986).  The 
reconstructionist approach has been taken by scholars 
such as White (1980), Hayes (1991), Savage and Adair 
(1977), and Boykin (1979).  
The constructionists have a more critical 
approach to so-called empirical methods as they question 
the argument that empiricism is the only valid way of 
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knowing (Harrell, 1999; Kambon, 1992, 1998).  They are 
not very much interested in exposing or correcting biases 
in the literature about Black people as much as they are 
interested in researching and creating “new paradigms and 
methodologies that stem from an organic, authentically 
African epistemological and ontological base” (Harrell, 
1999, p. 45).  Constructionists are represented by such 
scholars as Akbar (1981), Nobles (1973, 1986), Kambon 
(1992) and Wilson (1978, 1991), Pasteur and Toldson 
(1982), Azibo (1996) and Myers (1988).
From Ideological Ism to Praxis
African-centered psychology should move 
beyond ideologies and away from the claim that people 
have different ways of expressing themselves because of 
their cultural and social experience, which is already 
known extensively across disciplines.  Instead, African-
centered scholars should focus more on praxis.  In other 
words, they should build upon the ideological “ism” and 
adopt practical approaches to research, reflecting on how 
they can articulate what they do in ways that are practical, 
relevant, and that meet the needs and expectations of the 
people concerned. 
Such a move is perceptible in the radical 
theoretical orientation and constructionist’s practical 
inclination.  For example, Akbar’s (1994) and Nobles’ 
(2013) ideas of redefining psychology as Sakhu Sheti and 
Sakhu Sheti/Djaer, respectively, as a penetrating search and 
understanding of phenomena both visible and invisible. 
Nobles (2013), being one of the finest theoreticians in the 
field, advocates the construction of an African version 
of the Western Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DMS) that can describe the nosology 
and nosography of African illnesses that are both visible 
and invisible:  “The development of an African-centered 
classification of disease, that is, nosology, should at a 
minimum (a) use African languages and logic and (b) 
explore the application and relevance of these ideas and 
notions in illuminating….‘the suffering of the spirit’” (p. 
239).  Through ABPsi, African-centered psychologists 
and counselors have used African philosophical concepts 
such as Ubuntu and different community healing 
mechanisms to provide counsel to Black communities 
suffering from police brutality and other forms of social, 
political, economic oppression, and natural disasters in 
America and elsewhere, for example, the Michael Brown 
case in Ferguson or the victims of Haiti earthquake. 
Though Nobles’ and others’ practical works are still in 
progress, they are moving in the right direction.
Another move from ism to praxis is Kambon’s 
(1992) African Self-Consciousness (ASC), African 
Self-Extension Orientation (ASEO), and Cultural 
Misorientation (CM) measures that have been used in 
studies to show that African American college students 
with an African worldview orientation do well in 
academic self-concept than those with a Eurocentric 
worldview orientation (Iyanu, 2013).  Scholars are now 
using this model to explain healing modalities based on 
African cultures and traditional practices. 
The Transpersonal Dimension    
Early in this article, the concepts of Afrocentrism, 
Pan-Africanism, and Négritude were discussed.  The 
common theme in these concepts was the idea of “Africa” 
in African-centeredness.  The question that emerges is 
whether or not Africans both in the diaspora and on the 
continent share the same psychological experience.  After 
all, most African-descents in the diaspora were born and 
raised in the ambient culture, how do they then connect 
with those on the continent?  In addition to Nobles and 
Cooper’s (2013) answer to Hegel mentioned earlier, 
Asante (1984) had also suggested an answer to that 
question in the following quote:
The African American is to a degree a most 
Westernized African, yet has retained the Sudic 
Ideal of harmony, achieved by rhythm, and passed 
on to other cultures.  There is a unique experience of 
transcendence among Africans in the West, whether 
they are Cubans, Brazilians, Haitians, Jamaicans, 
Ecuadorians, or citizens of the United States; they 
share forms of the same experience in Samba the 
Brazilian dance, Sango the Cuban folk religion, 
Umbanda the Brazilian folk religion, Voodoo 
the Haitian folk religion, or Myal a Jamaican 
religion.  At the center of all of these forms of 
human expression is the same source of energy, the 
rhythm of polyrhythms that drive the spirit towards 
transcendence. (p. 168)
A sense of community living, attachment to 
cultural and ancestral values, and rhythm should be the 
bridge that links Africans in the diaspora with those 
on the continent and ought to be the basis upon which 
research is done both in African-centered psychology 
and transpersonal psychology.  The conversation around 
Afrocentrism, Pan-Africanism, and Négritude was an 
example of the quest for connectedness and harmony 
among Africans and African-descents around the world. 
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Though their respective psychological experiences may 
vary, they mostly rely on the following guiding principles 
in the study of their lived experience:
1. Spirit permeates everything
2. Everything in the universe is interconnected
3. Collective/community living is the most 
salient element of existence
4. Communal self-knowledge is the key to 
mental health (Nobles, 2013, pp. 292-
293). 
According to Myers (1988), an optimal African 
worldview consists of: (a) viewing the spiritual and 
material as one, (b) knowing the self through symbolic 
imagery and rhythm, (c) valuing positive interpersonal 
relationships among people, (d) emphasizing the 
union of opposites, (e) processing the interrelatedness 
of human and spiritual networks, (f) identifying the 
extended self and the multidimensionality of self, (g) 
assuming self-worth is intrinsic in being, (h) valuing 
spiritualism, oneness with nature and communalism, 
(i) being positively consistent despite appearances due to 
relationship with the source, and (j) having a life space 
that is infinite and unlimited (pp. 11-12). 
Moreover, it is Diop’s Two Cradle Theory that 
summarizes best the main principles of the African 
worldview upon which is based the quest for harmony, 
connectedness, and transcendence: ancestor/spirit 
veneration, social collectivity, and spiritual basis of 
existence (Wobogo, 1976).  In other words, a more 
appropriate approach to African-centered psychology 
and mode of transcendence includes “introspection 
and inclusion of constructs related to the soul and 
spirit and the centrality of such cultural constructs as 
interdependence, connection to nature, social collectivity 
in defining human functioning, and the consubstantial 
nature of things in the world” (Grills, 2002, p. 22).
Comparatively, transpersonal psychology might 
provide a platform that is outside of the ideological 
divisions within African-centered psychology and be 
more conducive to this area of study than mainstream 
psychology or religious study.  The scholarly field of 
transpersonal psychology embraces the spectrum of 
human affairs: spirituality, consciousness, culture, 
language, gender (Puhakka, 2008).  It also attempts 
to integrate timeless wisdom with Western modern 
psychology and translate spiritual principles into 
scientifically grounded, contemporary language (Caplan, 
2009).  Within such a framework, African-centered 
scholars can scientifically ground the study of African 
core principles such as ancestor/spirit veneration, social 
collectivity, and the spiritual basis of existence. 
Practical Application and Relevance of Africa’s Past
Building on transpersonal psychology’s 
framework and platform, African-centered scholars 
should be motivated by the aforementioned African 
core principles and reclaim Africa’s past.  Africa’s past 
is based on the Kemetic notion of what it means to be 
a human.  The Kemetic or ancient Egyptian knowledge 
presents three essential modalities within every human 
being, which are ka, ba, and sad (Mayi, 2010).  Ka is a 
person viewed as a specific modality of an individualized 
cosmic being, which is universal and eternal.  In other 
words, ka represents the psycho-affective and psycho-
cognitive aspects of human beings, which are immortal 
and eternal.  Ba is viewed as a person in terms of his or her 
moving capability, which means that ba is the entity that 
can move in and out of the body independently. From a 
purely biological perspective, ba is also viewed as blood 
and to some extent race, family, character, and so forth. 
Sad is the living body, which decomposes after death. 
It should be noted that each modality comprises 
an element of mortality and immortality.  This represents 
the Kemetic principle of duality, which allows for multiple 
readings of the patient’s condition while considering 
the fact that a person is destined to eternal life and is 
mortal, therefore susceptible to corruption (Mayi, 
2010).  According to Mayi, duality is not conflictual, 
ka, ba, and sad co-exist and their co-existence creates 
a vital energy that affects both the psyche and the 
body.  When the therapist understands this duality, he 
or she will be able to assess a patient who presents with 
psychosomatic illness.  This duality can also be observed 
in Freud’s concepts of libido, Eros, and Thanatos co-
existing within the individual, except that for Freud, the 
duality is conflictual.  African-centered scholars can use 
the Kemetic principle of duality, as described above, to 
develop practical approaches to mental health and move 
beyond ideologies. 
Conclusion
History, memory, and past are essential parts of an African-centered psychology and mode of 
transcendence.  Denying the existence of an African 
history is a crime against memory.  It is a discreet crime 
because of its subtle nature.  Yet, such a crime paves 
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the way for cultural hegemony where one cultural bloc 
dominates the other and creates conditions for cultural 
blocs, risking total annihilation of the dominated culture. 
There can be no African psychology without an African 
history, memory, and past.  To speak, then, of an African 
psychology, it is important, even imperative, to excavate 
its past, exhume its memory, and rehabilitate its history. 
 However, the challenge in the establishment of 
a viable and relevant African-centered psychology is to 
retrain and reeducate psychologists, not necessarily to 
unlearn their Euro-American psychology, but to consider 
African traditional thought, spirituality, and knowledge 
as valid scientific enterprise.  In so doing, African-
centered scholars can then move beyond ideological 
ism and develop more appropriate praxis to serve the 
communities concerned.
Ultimately, African-centered scholars still 
need to address their differences in thought processes, 
geographic experiences, cultural philosophies, beliefs, 
and worldviews in order to present evidence of the 
relevance of their scholarly contributions.  This implies 
developing appropriate research methods that reflect the 
diversity and complexity of their thoughts, introducing 
new concepts and themes that articulate their experience 
and research findings, and finally describe and implement 
a clear nosology and nosography of their mental health 
related diagnoses.  
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